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ARGUMENTS IN REPLY
The City of Garden City and The City of Meridian (hereinafter "the Cities") submitted

Appellants' Opening Brief on June 28, 2013. The Cities' central argument on appeal is that the
1994 Order is invalid because the District Judges

prior to issuing the order

failed to employ

any "suitable process or mode of proceeding ... most conformable to the spirit of [Idaho] code" as
the Idaho Legislature required when it enacted Idaho Code § 1-1622. See, e.g., Appellants'

Opening Brief; pp. 14-29. It is undisputed that the District Judges never made any factual
findings or held any hearings or meetings in which the Cities were afforded the opportunity to
appear, submit evidence, or present their arguments in opposition to the issuance of the 1994
Order. (R. pp. 267; 285-94) The Cities have illustrated that the District Judges' failure to afford
even basic due process or make factual findings before issuing the 1994 Order violated Idaho
Code§ 1-1622 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho
794 (2009). Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 14-29.
On July 29, 2013, Ada County and The Board of Ada County Commissioners
(hereinafter "Ada County") filed Respondents' Brief in which Ada County advanced three
primary arguments: First, Ada County suggests that the District Judges did employ a "suitable
process" prior to signing the 1994 Order simply by "organizing a panel of judges" that agreed to
sign the order. Respondents' Brief, pp. 14, 17. Second, Ada County incorrectly applies Idaho
Code§ 13-201 and Idaho Appellate Rule 14 in contending that the Cities' positions on appeal are
time barred for not having appealed the same in March 1995. Id. at pp. 18-21. Third, Ada
County argues that the District Judges' decision denying the Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994

Order should be affirmed on appeal because the Cities failed to plead and prove a "change in the
factual circumstances." Id. at pp. 11-13.
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1. Despite Ada County's assertion to the contrary, the District Judges did not

employ any "suitable process" prior to signing the 1994 Order in compliance
with Idaho Code§ 1-1622.
In Respondents' Brief, Ada County suggests that the District Judges' sole act of
"organizing a panel of judges" which signed the 1994 Order alone amounted to a "suitable
process" in compliance with Idaho Code§ 1-1622. See, e.g., Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-16 and
p. 17 ("Creating a panel of the district court judges who agree to and sign an order is a suitable

process .... "). Ada County argues that the District Judges were not required to hold hearings,
consider evidence, or afford any due process-like protections prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Id.
at pp. 13-17. Additionally, in an exercise of circular reasoning, Ada County suggests that the
District Judges' process in 1994 was suitable simply because the District Judges determined it to
be suitable:
Because section 1-2218 grants district courts authority to create
magistrate court facilities in its cities, but does not codify a process
of doing so, a district court's inherent power to fashion a suitable
process of doing so is guided by its own determination of a suitable
process or mode of procedure.

Respondents' Brief, p. 14 (emphasis added). See also, Id. ("Organizing a panel of judges is a
suitable process because it complies with section 1-2218's requirement than an order is to be
issued by a majority of the district's district court judges.").
Ada County's arguments ignore the plain text of Idaho Code § 1-1622 as well as the
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794 (2009). While the
District Judges do possess inherent authority to fashion their own suitable process in deciding
whether to issue an order pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-2218, the process they elect to follow must
still be "most conformable to the spirit of [Idaho] code." See I.C. § 1-1622 and City of Boise,
14 7 Idaho 794, 802-03.
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In City of Boise, this Court recognized that in order for the District Judges' process to be
"suitable" and in conformance with the spirit of Idaho Code, a governmental entity with a
substantial financial interest at stake must first be given the opportunity to appear and be heard
before the District Judges take action pursuant to § 1-2218. See 174 Idaho 794, 803-804 (citing

In Re the Petition of Idaho State Fed'n of Labor, 75 Idaho 367, 370 (1954) (process must afford
any interested person the opportunity to appear at a hearing) and Roche v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. App. 255 (1916) (process must "preserve to the parties the fundamental essentials of notice
and hearing.")).
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that to deny a financially-interested entity the
opportunity to appear and be heard in a § 1-2218 proceeding "would be repugnant to our
concepts of fairness and due process." 147 Idaho at 803 (emphasis added). Surely, it would be
equally repugnant to the spirit of Idaho Code for a panel of District Judges to issue a § 1-2218
order based solely upon an ex parte review of a one-sided and unverified petition. In addition to
ensuring fairness and due process, preventing arbitrary judicial decision-making is a fundamental
objective ofldaho Code and Idaho's judicial process. 14 7 Idaho at 802 (recognizing that issuing,
modifying, or vacating a § 1-2218 order "involves judicial decision-making and, as such, is not
administrative in nature.") (citations omitted).
In light of this Court's holding in City of Boise, it is surprising that Ada County would
now argue that the District Judges did not need to afford the Cities with any due process or due
process-like protections prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Respondents' Brief, pp. 16-17. Issuing a

§ 1-2218 order requiring a city to provide magistrate facilities undoubtedly imposes substantial
financial obligations upon that city. (R. pp. 379-83; 389-90) Ada County's argument is
particularly disingenuous considering its prior positions on the matter. In 1994, Ada County
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(along with the City of Boise) prepared and submitted the petition which requested that the
District Judges appoint a special master to "gather evidence, hold hearings, and report to the
District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District his/her findings" as to the "appropriateness of an
order" and level of proposed contributions. (R. 358-361) Moreover, it was Ada County who
sought to intervene in the City of Boise's petition to vacate the 1980 Order, contending that its
financial "interests would be impacted by an adverse decision" and its participation "allowed for
a more complete, balanced and thorough review of the issues presented in [the] petition." City of

Boise, 147 Idaho 794, 802 (2009).
Notwithstanding, it remains undisputed that pnor to 1ssmng the 1994 Order neither
Garden City nor Meridian were served with the petition or even notified that it had actually been
filed with the Fourth Judicial District. (R. pp. 267; 285-94) The Cities were also not afforded any
opportunity to appear at a single hearing or meeting, present evidence, or even express their
position as to whether issuing an order was warranted. (R. pp. 267; 285-94) 1 Additionally, the
record is void of any evidence suggesting that the District Judges held any hearings or meetings,
gathered any evidence, made any factual findings, or did anything other than merely review the
unverified and one-sided petition before signing the 1994 Order. (R. p. 362) And, despite having
expressly requested a hearing or meeting on their 1\1otion for Reconsideration or Delay in

Execution, the Cities were never afforded such an opportunity. (R. p. 384) Given that the
District Judges afforded no due process protections and failed to make any factual findings, it is

1

Ada County suggests that informal conversations that allegedly took place sometime in 1993 or 1994 between the
Trial Court Administrator and the Cities' respective Mayors regarding contributions to the magistrate rendered the
District Judges' process in issuing the 1994 Order "suitable". Respondents' Brief, p. 15. However, the record is void
of any testimony or admissible evidence establishing the nature and content of what was actually discussed.
Regardless, arguing that non-specific, off-the-record conversations with the Trial Court Administrator amounted to
due process lacks merit.
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unreasonable to conclude that the District Judges had employed a process that was "suitable" and
"most conformable to the spirit of the code."
2. The Cities' arguments on appeal are not time barred as Ada County wrongly
asserts.
Ada County argues that the Cities' arguments on appeal are barred because the Cities
failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Respondents' Brief, pp. 18-21. Ada County contends that
Cities were required to appeal the District Judges' purported decision denying the Cities' joint

Motion for Reconsideration or Delay in Execution no later than March 1995. Id. at p. 18. For
authority, Ada County cites to Idaho Code§ 13-201 and Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
As set forth below, Ada County's argument fails for at least three reasons:
First, Idaho Code § 13-201 and IAR 14 do not apply because the below proceeding was
not a "civil action." Idaho Code § 13-201 applies only to appeals taken from a district court in a
civil action. Likewise, IAR 14(a) governs appeals from "any judgment or order of the district
court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action." In City of Boise, the Idaho
Supreme Court specifically rejected Ada County's attempt to characterize proceedings pursuant
to § 1-2218 as civil actions. See, e.g., City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 802 (2009)
("While this proceeding may bear some similarity to a civil action, we decline to categorize it as
such.").
Second, even if § 13-201 and IAR 14 apply to the 1994 proceeding, the District Judges
never entered a "final judgment" from which the Cities could have appealed. See, e.g., Spokane

Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619 (2010) (clarifying that Idaho's
appellate courts lack jurisdiction unless the lower court entered a separate, final judgment
pursuant to Rules 54 and 58 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.). Here, it is undisputed that
the District Judges never entered either an order denying the Cities' Motion for Reconsideration
6

or Delay in Execution or a separate final judgment from which an appeal could have been taken.
(R. pp. 384, 389-90)
Third, there was never a need for the Cities to file an appeal in 1995 because it soon
became clear to all involved that the Fourth Judicial District and Ada County had decided to
pursue an alternative option to the 1994 Order - i.e. the construction of a new, centralized county
courthouse. In March 1995, it was the Fourth Judicial District's stated intent that the Cities build
separate magistrate facilities in their respective city limits subject to various minimum standards.
(R. pp. 379-83; 389-90) ("Our minimum standards for a courtroom are at least 700 square feet
with a permanent, raised bench, and a pem1anent six person jury box designed with a full-length
vanity shield.")).
However, by October 1995, Ada County and the Fourth Judicial District had decided
instead to build a "new courthouse" in Boise. (R. p. 391 ). Ada County elected to "provide at its
sole cost and expense a single courthouse complex for both the District Court and Magistrate
Division". (R. p. 35). Neither Ada County nor the Fourth Judicial District discussed the 1994
Order at any time during the next thirteen years, effectively shelving the 1994 Order, if not
rescinding it altogether by way of inaction. (R. 394). Building separate magistrate facilities in
Garden City and Meridian would have been inconsistent with the plan to build a centralized
courthouse in Boise.

Accordingly, in 2004, when Meridian offered to provide space for a

magistrate court in its new City Hall, Ada County declined. (R. 392-93) Ada County's claim
that 1995 was followed by "nineteen years of effort by the courts to get the Appellants to provide
magistrate courts" is unsupported by the record and simply not true. (Respondents' Brief, p. 19).
Rather, all those involved had simply forgotten about the 1994 Order until 2008 when Ada
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County located the order in some file and began using it as means of eliciting monetary
contributions from the Cities. (R. p. 394).
3. Finally, the Cities are not barred from filing a subsequent petition to vacate the
1994 Order on the grounds that there has been a change in circumstances.

Ada County argues that the Cities failed to meet their burden of showing a change in
circumstances and should not be given "yet another bite at the apple." Respondents' Brief, p. 13.
This argument mischaracterizes the procedural history below as well as the actual scope of the
Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order.
The Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order was a narrow motion limited solely to the
issue of whether the District Judges employed a "suitable process" prior to issuing the 1994
Order. (R. 320-33) The motion was filed in the declaratory judgment action and before the
District Judges unilaterally converted the matter into a § 1-2218 proceeding. (R. 262) As stated
on the record during the July 26, 2012 hearing, the Cities intentionally raised no other issues in
that motion and anticipated filing additional motions in the future, including a motion to vacate
on the grounds that there had been a "change in circumstances." (Tr. March 3, 2012, p. 40, 11. 1925; p. 41, 11. 1-18). A subsequent motion contending there had been a change in circumstances
would have involved considerable factual discovery that would have proved unnecessary had the
District Judges agreed in the first instance that the 1994 Order was invalid as having been issued
in violation of Idaho Code § 1-1622.
Despite the limited scope of the Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order, it appears the
District Judges nonetheless made a factual finding that there had not been any "substantial and
material change of circumstances" that would justify rescinding the 1994 Order. (R. 425) In

Appellants' Opening Brief, the Cities illustrated that this was error on the part of the District
Judges because the Cities had neither raised that issue in their motion nor yet been given the
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opportunity to engage in the necessary discovery to meet the burden of proof. Appellants'

Opening Brief, pp. 12-13. Said differently, that issue was not before the District Judges and
there was no evidence on the record to support the District Judges' conclusion. The Cities
should not be barred from filing a future petition to vacate the 1994 Order on the basis of a
"change in circumstances," especially since there is no longer any need or desire for separate
magistrate court facilities in Meridian and Garden City.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Ada County is not entitled to attorney's fees. Neither Idaho Code § 12-117 or§ 12-121
apply because the proceeding below was not a civil action. See, e.g. City of Boise, 147 Idaho
794, 802 (2009). Similarly, Ada County is not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-121 because this appeal was not brought "frivolously, unreasonably, or without

foundation." See, e.g., Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 396 (2008). There is little
case law in Idaho interpreting Idaho Code § 1-1622 and this Court's holding in City of Boise
supports the Cities' position that the District Judges were required to provide the Cities with due
process prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Furthermore, Ada County is not entitled to attorney's
fees on appeal because Ada County failed to set forth any argument in support of their request.

See, e.g., Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 228 (2011) (party seeking attorney's fees on appeal
must support the claim with argument as well as authority.").
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in Appellants' Opening Brief, the Cities respectfully
submit that the Idaho Supreme Court should void the 1994 Order. No order of any court or
judicial body should be held valid where it was issued in clear contravention of due process,
fundamental fairness, and basic notions of sound judicial decision making.
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If Ada County

wishes to pursue a new order, then it can simply file another petition with the District Court
pursuant to § 1-2218. Upon the filing of a new petition, the District Judges can then ensure that
a "suitable process" is employed by affording Ada County and the Cities equal opportunity to
appear, submit evidence, and present arguments for consideration. In doing so, the parties will
be afforded due process and the District Judges will be able to make a more complete, balanced,
and thorough decision.
DATED this_ day of August, 2013.
MOORE & ELIA, LLP

DATED
GARDEN CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Frank Walker
Counsel for Appellant City of Garden City
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